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Public spending on child care has taken a high ﬂight in the Netherlands. One of the key policy
goals of child care subsidies is to stimulate labour participation. We study the impact of child
care subsidies on labour participation using a general equilibrium model. Next to the labour
supply choice, we also model the choice over formal and informal care. The choice between
formal and informal care plays an important role in the overall impact of child care subsidies on
labour participation. The model is calibrated to Dutch data. Our analysis shows that existing
child care subsidies have promoted labour participation. However, at the current average subsidy
rate of almost 80%, a further increase in the subsidy rate is a rather ineffective way to promote
formal participation, the main effect being substitution of informal for formal care.
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Abstract in Dutch
De subsidies voor formele kinderopvang zijn de afgelopen jaren fors geïntensiveerd. Een
belangrijk beleidsdoel van kinderopvangsubsidies is het stimuleren van formele
arbeidsparticipatie door ouders. In dit document analyseren we het effect van
kinderopvangsubsidies op de arbeidsparticipatie met behulp van een
algemeen-evenwichtsmodel. Het model is gekalibreerd op Nederlandse data. Naast de
arbeidsaanbodbeslissing wordt daarbij ook de keuze tussen formele en informele opvang
gemodelleerd. De endogene keuze tussen formele en informele opvang speelt een belangrijke rol
bij het effect van kinderopvangsubsidies op de arbeidsparticipatie. Onze analyse laat zien dat de
bestaande subsidies een positief effect hebben gehad op de arbeidsparticipatie. De subsidievoet
is met gemiddeld bijna 80% inmiddels echter zo hoog geworden, dat een verdere verhoging
vanuit participatie-oogpunt weinig effectief is. Een verdere verhoging van de subsidievoet leidt
met name tot het vervangen van informele opvang door formele opvang.
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Public spending on child care has risen substantially over the past years in the Netherlands.
Indeed, subsidy rates for formal child care and the share of young children participating in
formal child care are by now comparable to Scandinavian countries. One of the key objectives of
child care subsidies is to stimulate formal labour participation by parents, in persons and in
hours per week. This document employs a general equilibrium model to study the impact of
child care subsidies on formal participation, calibrated to Dutch data.
The author is grateful to the Ministry of Education, Culture and Science for data used in Figure
2.1 and Figure 2.4, Janneke Rijn (CPB) for constructing the Labour Force Survey data used in
Figure 2.2, and Mariëlle Cloïn (SCP) for the data used in Figure 2.3. Furthermore, the author
thanks Albert van der Horst, Ruud de Mooij, seminar participants at the Utrecht School of





Recent years have witnessed a number of dramatic changes in the child care market. The
government has increased the subsidy rate for formal child care. As a result the cost share of
parents dropped from 40% on average in 2005 to 20% in 2009. At the same time, the use of
formal child care increased sharply, the use of informal child care dropped sharply, and labour
participation by young mothers went up. In this document we develop a model to study the
impact of child care subsidies on the use of formal and informal child care, and (female)
participation.
We introduce child care subsidies in the general equilibrium model MIMIC. The subsidies
affect the decision of parents of whether or not to work, and how many hours to work, and
whether they will use formal or informal child care. A higher subsidy rate for formal child care
increases the marginal return of working more hours. As a result, more parents decide to start
working, or to work more hours. In particular secondary earners and single parents (mostly
women) who are more responsive to ﬁnancial incentives than primary earners (mostly men). Our
model produces results that are in line with micro-econometric studies on the impact of child
care subsidies on labour supply. The effect on labour supply is small, in particular at high
subsidy rates, and the (small) effect is bigger for single parents.
A second effect of subsidies for formal child care is that they make formal child care more
attractive than informal child care. The choice over formal and informal care depends on the
parental fees for both types of care and an idiosyncratic preference for formal over informal care.
These preferences capture e.g. quality differences between formal and informal care as
perceived by parents. We calibrate this preference distribution so that the share of parents
choosing formal and informal care is in line with the data, and the price elasticity of formal child
care is in line with empirical studies. A drop in the parental fee for formal care will cause some
parents to switch from informal to formal care. This is a problem when it comes to labour
participation as parents that switch from informal to formal care give up a compensating
differential between formal and informal care. Indeed, following a price drop of formal care, the
last parent to switch to formal care has a compensating differential that exactly offsets the
difference in parental fees. Because some parents give up a compensating differential, part of the
higher subsidies is `lost´ to substitution with little effect on labour supply.
We further calibrate the preference distribution for formal and informal care so that the price
elasticity of the use of formal child care rises with the subsidy rate. The meta analysis of Ooms
et al. (2003) suggests a price elasticity of formal child care of around .2. However, the steep rise
in the use of formal child care following the drop in the parental fee in recent years suggests a
much larger elasticity, in the order of .4. We capture both the lower elasticity in the past and the
higher elasticity in recent years with our choice for a logistic (S-shaped) preference distribution.
Finally, we take into account that the subsidies have to be ﬁnanced. In all simulations we
9impose that the government maintains a balanced budget, where additional expenditures/savings
are covered by an across-the-board increase/decrease in income tax rates.
In the calibrated model, we simulate small and big changes in the subsidy rate for formal
child care. For an increase in the subsidy rate that implies a 25% drop in the parental fee, we ﬁnd
an increase in aggregate labour supply of only .05%. Aggregate employment gets a small
additional boost from lower unemployment because employment becomes more attractive
relative to unemployment. This moderates wage claims and stimulates labour demand. There is
a large effect on formal child care, which rises by 10%, despite a small effect on labour supply,
due to the substitution of informal for formal care.
The impact of changes in child care subsidies is nonlinear. This becomes more apparent once
we consider bigger changes in the subsidy rate. In particular, when we reduce the subsidy rate,
we lose labour supply at an increasing rate for every euro of subsidy we withdraw. The initial
increase in the parental fee results mostly in substitution of informal for formal care. Once we
increase the parental fee further, the substitution of informal for formal care becomes less
important, and additional savings increasingly come from reduced labour supply.
To study what all current subsidies for formal child care have meant for formal participation
we consider the extreme case of abolishing all subsidies for formal child care. According to the
model, aggregate employment could fall by some .8% (labour supply of secondary earners and
single parents with dependent children would fall by 1.4% and 6.8% respectively).
We also consider the other extreme of making child care `free´ for parents. Our simulation
results suggest that this could be very costly in terms of public expenditures, due to a large shift
of informal to formal care, with only a marginal effect on labour supply and employment.
Indeed, a large part of the increase in labour supply due to the additional subsidies is lost due to
the higher income tax rates to balance the government budget.
Our analysis suggests that the higher subsidy rate for formal child care has played a big role
in the steep rise of the use of formal child care, but only a minor role in the rise in female
participation. Most of the subsidies have gone to substitution of informal for formal child care.
Furthermore, when we increase the subsidy rate, subsidies are `lost´ at an increasing rate to
substitution of informal for formal care. This makes a further increase in the average subsidy
rate (currently almost 80%) rather costly in terms of stimulating labour supply.
Another way to motivate higher subsidies for formal child care is to assume that participation
in formal child care stimulates the development of the child. However, empirical studies give a
mixed picture on this, it may beneﬁt some groups, but hurt others. A further increase in the
subsidy for formal child care would mostly lower the price of high income families, whereas
participation in child care seems to be mostly beneﬁcial for children from low income families.
101 Introduction
The participation rate of Dutch women has risen dramatically over the past decades.1 In 1975,
the participation rate of Dutch women was still the lowest in the OECD at 31%.2 By 2007, the
participation rate of Dutch women had risen to 71%, the highest participation rate for women in
the EU-15 after the Nordics.3 A large part of the rise in participation has been by women with
young children.
With the rise in female participation, child care subsidies have received increased attention in
the Netherlands. Many have pointed to the Nordics where high public spending on child care
goes hand in hand with high participation rates of women.4 Recent years have witnessed a
dramatic increase in public spending on formal child care in the Netherlands, and participation
rates (>50% for 0-3 year olds) and subsidy rates (close to 80% on average5) are by now
comparable to the Nordics.
In this paper we study the relation between (female) participation and public spending on
formal child care. Indeed, high public spending goes hand in hand with high female
participation, but correlation is not causation. The question is whether high public spending on
formal child care is driving the high participation rate of Nordic women, or whether the high
participation rate of Nordic women is driving high public spending on formal child care, or
both? We consider the causal relation running from child care subsidies to participation. We
study this relation in a general equilibrium model with at its core a micro simulation model for
labour supply. In the labour supply module, we convert the child care subsidy into an equivalent
increase in the net wage. This is complicated by the fact that individuals may choose between
formal and informal care. Indeed, in calculating the equivalent increase in net wages we take
into account that parents may give up compensating differentials (e.g. quality differentials) when
they switch from informal to formal care. The general equilibrium context is also important,
since it allows us to take into account relevant mechanisms running via the budget constraint of
the government (no manna from heaven) and via wage formation (subsidies and taxes affect
equilibrium unemployment). The model is calibrated on Dutch data (levels) and international
studies (elasticities).
This is not the ﬁrst study by CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis into the
1 E-mail: jongen@cpb.nl.
2 Source: OECD Labor Force Statistics, women aged 15-64.
3 In terms of full time equivalents, the participation of Dutch women still remains low by international standards. Indeed,
some 60 percent of employed Dutch women worked part-time in 2007, by far the highest share in the OECD.
4 A cross-country study by Jaumotte (2003) suggests that a positive relation between public spending on formal child care
and female participation rates remains after controlling for other factors.
5 Source: Ministry of Education, Culture and Science.
11effects of child care subsidies, the present study builds on Graaﬂand et al. (2001).6 A number of
reasons motivated this sequel. An essential part of the setup in Graaﬂand et al. (2001) was the
rationing in the formal child care market. This rationing seems to have largely disappeared (see
e.g. Portegijs et al., 2006). Furthermore, the analysis in Graaﬂand et al. (2001) was based on the
old system of `supply oriented´ ﬁnancing of child care in the Netherlands. Under the old system,
some places were subsidized by the state, some places were subsidized by employers, and some
places were not subsidized. Since 2005, with the introduction of the Wet kinderopvang (Law on
child care), all places that meet certain criteria receive the same subsidy by the government.
Another simpliﬁcation was the replacement of a `voluntary´, and hence rather heterogeneous,
contribution by employers by a premium, in 2007. The smaller role of rationing and the uniform
ﬁnancing allow for a somewhat simpler modelling of child care subsidies and labour supply.
This then allows us to complicate things in another direction, we introduce a structural model for
the choice between formal and informal care, an important factor in the labour supply effect of
child care subsidies. This sequel further allows us to use more recent data on the use of formal
and informal care, and some recent studies on the price elasticity of formal child care (in
particular the meta analysis by Ooms et al., 2003) and the wage elasticity of labour supply (in
particular the meta analysis by Evers et al., 2008). Furthermore, we can now compare the results
with the recent empirical literature on the impact of child care subsidies in Europe, where most
`older´ studies were typically on US data, and the results seem to differ between Europe and the
US. Also, we consider a number of policy options that were not studied by Graaﬂand et al.
(2001), like `free´ child care (for parents), and an income dependent tax credit for secondary
earners with young children.
The outline of the paper is as follows. In Section 2 we ﬁrst consider some data on child care
and female participation in the Netherlands. Next, Section 3 starts with a general introduction to
the model we use for the analysis, and subsequently considers in more detail how child care
affects the different model blocks. In Section 4 we discuss the calibration of the model and
Section 5 gives the simulation results. In Section 6 we provide some sensitivity analyses. Section
7 compares the ﬁndings with some other studies, where we focus on recent studies for Europe.
In section 8 we compare the impact of child care subsidies with the impact of a secondary earner
tax deduction. After discussing some remaining issues in Section 9, Section 10 concludes.
6 Hence the `revisited´ in the title.
122 Data on child care and female participation
Figure 2.1 shows the rise in formal child care in the Netherlands. The solid line gives the number
of full time places for 0-3 year olds.7 The dashed line is the number of `full time´ places for
4-12 year olds, out-of-school care as Dutch children typically (98%) go to school from the age 4
onwards.8 Both series show a steady increase since the early 1990s, and the growth seems to
accelerate over the period 2005-2008. The latter will in part be due to the business cycle
upswing during this period, but an important factor is presumably also the sharp drop in the price
of formal child care (see below).
Another interesting development is in the formal use of so-called `guest parents´. Guest
parent care is small scale formal care for 0-12 year olds, typically at the home of the care taker
or of the child. As we can see from the data, it was not a big phenomenon up to 2005, and if
anything it seemed to decline over the period 2001-2004. But that changed dramatically after
2005. With the introduction of the Law on child care in 2005, subsidies for guest parents became
similar to those for care in centres, effectively they became much higher. Hence, for parents and
guest parents it became much more interesting to organise the care formally. Furthermore, with
some delay, people ﬁgured out that informal care by relatives and friends was now also
considered guest parent care, and this was presumably a major factor in the rapid rise in guest
parent care in recent years.9
One of the important drivers of the steady increase in formal care has been the rise in the
participation of working mothers with young children. Figure 2.2 gives the annual growth rates
for employment and average hours worked for women aged 20-50 with a child less than 12 years
old. For comparison we also consider women aged 20-50 but without a child less than 12 years
old. We see that over the whole period the growth in the participation rate of `young mothers´
has been substantially above that for other women. Furthermore, for both groups the growth rate
seems to drop over the period 1995-2005, followed by an upswing in 2006 and 2007. A simple
`eyeball´ test lends little support to the hypothesis that the much higher subsidy rate for formal
child care after 2005 has spurred the recent rise in participation by young mothers. Indeed, the
business cycle upswing seems a more likely candidate. Figure 2.2 also shows the remarkable
stability of hours worked per woman, both for young mothers and other women. Over the whole
period, the growth of hours worked has ﬂuctuated around zero.
Another (perhaps related) driver of child care is presumably changing preferences towards
7 Most children go to daycare only 2 or 3 days a week, as most mothers work only part time.
8 A `full time` place for 4-12 year olds is about half of a full time place for a 0-3 year old (50 hours per week), they spend
most of the working day at school with the exception of Wednesdays and (often) Fridays, and during school holidays.
9 The interested reader may consult e.g. www.doltje.nl to check the subsidy they can get. For example, a couple that
earns about 50 thousand euro and whose parents (ofﬁcially) take care of two grandchildren for 24 hours per week get
over 10 thousand euro of subsidy per year.
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15the use of formal care. As an indicator, Figure 2.3 shows the share of individuals (16-74) who
agree with the statement "A working mother is not a problem", over the period 1982-2004
(unfortunately the question was dropped in later surveys). Presuming that most people have no
problem with female participation per se, this could be seen as an indicator of attitudes towards
sending children to child care. The share of women who agree with the statement has risen by
some 20 percentage points over this period. The share of men who agree with the statement has
risen even more, by some 35 percentage points, but a sizeable gap remains between the opinions
of men and women. Although changing preferences probably contributed to the rise in formal
child care, explaining the recent acceleration in the growth of formal child care with an
acceleration in preference changes seems rather convenient, and also unnecessary.
Indeed, a more likely candidate for the recent surge in the use of formal child care is the
dramatic drop in the parental contribution rate in 2006 and 2007. Up to 2005 the contribution
rate for formal child care for parents dropped as well, but gradually, as more and more
subsidized places by ﬁrms and the government became available.10 Since 2005, all formal child
care places get the same subsidy rate. In 2006 and 2007 the government increased the subsidy
rate substantially, in part ﬁnanced by the introduction of a premium for employers. Figure 2.4
shows the change in the cost share of formal child care for the ﬁrst child for parents from 2005 to
2007. In both years, households with a lower income get a higher subsidy rate, but we see that
the main change from 2005 to 2007 was for the middle and high income households. Taking into
account the different (more generous) subsidy rate for the second (and third etc.) child and
weighing the households by their densities we ﬁnd that the average cost share of parents in
formal child care dropped from 37% in 2005 to just 19% in 2007.11
The ﬁnal part of the story is the substitution of informal care for formal care. As more formal
places became available and the price of formal places for parents dropped, parents became
increasingly able and eager to use formal care. According to Groot and Maassen van den Brink
(1996) the share of formal child care in both formal and informal care was 16% in 1995. By
2006 the share of formal care had risen to 41% (Statistics Netherlands). More recent data are
scarce. The survey results of Berden and Kok (2009) suggest there was a massive shift from
informal to formal care between 2004 and 2008: for 0-3, 4-7 and 8-12 year olds, the share of
parents using formal care in the total of parents using formal and informal care rose from
respectively 58 to 77%, 22 to 54% and 21 to 44%. These dramatic shifts can explain the rapid
rise in the use of formal care following the sharp drop in the price for parents in 2006 and 2007.
The rise in the participation of mothers is a less likely candidate, since the growth rate of the
participation by working mothers has been `average´ at best when we consider the past say 10
10 For example, subsidized places by ﬁrms rose from 25 to 82 thousand between 1994 and 2001 (Statistics Netherlands).
11 Source: Ministry of Education, Culture and Science.
16years, see Figure 2.1.12
Below we outline a model that is able to capture these stylised facts on the use of formal and
informal child care, and female participation, and allows us to study the causal relation between
them.
12 Though one could argue that additional working mothers have to rely more heavily on formal child care than in the past.
17183 The model
We study the impact of child care subsidies in the so-called MIMIC model of CPB Netherlands
Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis. We ﬁrst give a brief informal introduction to the MIMIC
model, and subsequently consider the adaptations we made to study the impact of child care
subsidies.
3.1 A brief introduction to MIMIC
MIMIC is a computable general equilibrium models that CPB typically employs to study the
long term impact of policy changes targeted at the labour market. Behavioural equations are
derived explicitly from utility and proﬁt maximisation, given technology and policy. MIMIC
incorporates broadly accepted economic theories of labour supply, wage formation and job
matching. The structural setup of MIMIC facilitates easy interpretation of simulation results in
terms of rational individual behaviour, and makes the simulation results less prone to the
Lucas-critique. For a detailed overview of the model see Graaﬂand et al. (2001). De Mooij et al.
(2006) give a recent overview of a large number of simulations and relate the outcomes to the
ﬁndings in the literature on welfare state reform. Child care subsidies affect the agents in the
model mainly through labour supply and wage formation. We consider the model blocks below.
3.2 The labour supply model
3.2.1 The general setup
The labour supply model in MIMIC distinguishes 40 types of households, which together
represent the total population aged over 15 in The Netherlands. Two types of households are
directly affected by child care subsidies: single-parent and two-parent households with
dependent children. The analysis below gives the determination of labour supply for two-parent
households, the determination of labour supply for single-parent households goes along similar
lines.
Individuals maximize the utility of the household. For simplicity we assume that partners in
the household take the labour supply choice of the other partner as given. Individuals can choose
from a discrete set J of working hours options. Furthermore, to reproduce heterogeneous hours
choices across households, we introduce an idiosyncratic preference for working hours hi by
individual i. When the individual deviates from hi he or she incurs a cost b per hour deviation.
Let hj denote the number of working hours in labour supply option j. Furthermore, let cj and lj
denote consumption and leisure for the household in option j, respectively. Utility for individual
i in option j is then given by
U(cj;lj;hj;hi) = u(cj;lj) bjhj  hij; (3.1)
19Figure 3.1 Discrete choice model of labour supply
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indifferent individual
where u(:) denotes `common´ utility derived from consumption and leisure in option j (a
Stone-Geary function) and bjhj  hij is the idiosyncratic deviation cost from individual i when
choosing option j.
Idiosyncratic preferences for working hours are uniformly distributed over individuals
between the lower bound h and the upper bound h. We can determine which individuals choose
which labour supply option by looking for the individuals that are indifferent between two
particular labour supply options. Figure 3.1 illustrates the procedure graphically for the
simpliﬁed case where individuals can only choose between a part time and a full time job (the
method is the same for our setup with more options). Denote working hours in the part time and
full time job by hpt and hft respectively, and consumption and leisure by cpt and cft, and lpt and
lft respectively. Choosing the part time option generates utility u(cpt;lpt) bjhpt  hij and
choosing the full time option generates utility u(cft;lft) bjhft  hij. Provided that the
difference in common utility between the two options is not too big, those with high/low hi will




Given the common utilities in each option we choose the distribution of individual
preferences for working hours so that all options are ﬁlled and the shares in the different options
are in line with the data. We choose the deviation cost parameter b, so that the wage elasticity of
labour supply for breadwinners, partners and singles is in line with empirical studies (see the
calibration below). Speciﬁcally, when we increase the wage rate, more individuals will choose to
work full time, hc will shift to the left, and we use b to steer how many individuals will switch
20from part time to full time.
3.2.2 Labour supply with child care
Next we introduce child care. We consider how working hours translates in total child care
demand, the choice between formal and informal child care, and ﬁnally child care costs per
labour supply option.
From hours worked to total child care demand
We take the perspective of the (potential) secondary earners in the household, which we will call
`partners´ (the decisions of the breadwinners are determined in a similar way). Let hp denote the
number of hours worked by the partner in a particular labour supply option, and let hb be the
(given) number of hours worked by the breadwinner. We assume that the partner and
breadwinner minimize the demand for child care outside the household by minimizing the
overlap in working hours. The demand for child care outside the household, cc, is given by
cc(hp) = maxf0;hb+hp  hftg; (3.2)
where hft is the number of working hours of a full time equivalent.13
In the model we only distinguish between families with and without children. However, not
all families with a child in the model have a child aged 0-12. Furthermore, many parents use
(typically) unpaid informal care by family and friends, and the 4-12 year olds only need to use
out-of-school care `part time´, i.e. after school hours. In general, we may wish to distinguish
between child care for 0-3 and 4-12 year olds, given that certain policies may target only one
group of young children. To capture these factors, average paid child care demand for 0-3 and
4-12 year olds in a labour supply option with hours hp is
cc3(hp) = g3maxf0;hb+hp  hftg; (3.3)
and
cc12(hp) = g12maxf0;hb+hp  hftg; (3.4)
respectively. The parameters g3 for 0-3 year olds and g12 for 4-12 year olds capture that only part
of working couples with dependent children has a child in the relevant age category, only part of
them uses paid care, and 4-12 year olds only need formal care after school hours.
We implicitly assume that the use of unpaid informal care is a non-choice. Indeed, data from
Portegijs et al. (2006) suggest that parents are at a corner regarding the use of unpaid care; they
13 Some examples illustrate that the relation above makes sense. When the partner does not work there is no demand for
child care, when the breadwinner works full time and the partner works 50 percent they demand child care for 50 percent
of a full time place, and if both the breadwinner and the partner work 80 percent (`4 days a week´) they demand 60
percent of a full time place (`3 days a week´).
21would like to use more if it were available.14 However, as we will see below, we may wish to
relax this assumption when we consider the extreme case where the government pays the full
price of child care, `free´ child care for parents.
The choice between formal and informal care
Next we consider how households allocate the remaining demand for child care over paid formal
and paid informal care. This depends on two factors: i) the price of formal care relative to
informal care, and ii) an idiosyncratic cost or beneﬁt of using formal care relative to informal
care.
First consider the prices of formal and informal care. For simplicity we assume that the full
price of paid formal care pw and paid informal care pb is independent of household income.
However, parents receive a subsidy for the use of formal care which depends on household
income. As we can see from Figure 2.4 above, the cost share sw for parents can be well
approximated by a minimum percentage sw up to some income y, a cost share that rises linearly
with income at rate mpw beyond y, up to some maximum income where we reach a maximum
cost share sw, or
sw(yb;yp) = minfmaxfsw;sw +mpw(yb+yp  y)g;swg; (3.5)
where yb is the income of the breadwinner and yp is the income of the partner in some labour
supply option. Individuals with a higher income will pay more for formal care and hence will be
less inclined to use formal care, ceteris paribus.
However, not all low income households use formal care and not all high income households
use informal care.15 Indeed, parents differ in their valuation of formal and informal care, for
various reasons. Some parents may prefer to use an unsubsidised au pair who will also take the
children to social activities like sports clubs. Other parents may simply not want to bother with
the administrative procedures related to formal care. We capture all these individual reasons for
preferring informal over formal care (and vice versa) with an idiosyncratic distribution for a
relative cost or beneﬁt using informal care over formal care across households.16 This
distribution also allows us to calibrate the price elasticity of formal care independent of the
labour supply effect. The choice over formal and informal care together with the effect on labour
supply determines the overall price elasticity.
Figure 3.2 illustrates this idiosyncratic relative beneﬁt/cost distribution graphically.
Households are ordered according to their idiosyncratic beneﬁt/cost for formal over informal
14 In the survey of Portegijs et al. (2006), of the parents with children 0-12 year old, 43 percent of parents would like to
use informal care by relatives and friends, but only 26 percent can realize this demand.
15 See e.g. the "Monitor Arbeid en Zorg" from Statistics Netherlands.
16 An alternative interpretation is that there is not a single price for paid informal care, but a distribution of paid informal
care prices.
22Figure 3.2 The choice over paid formal and informal care
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p_b - s_w0 * p_w
p_b - s_w1 * p_w
C
child care, where individuals to the left favour formal over informal care, ceteris paribus, and
vice versa for the ones on the right. The beneﬁts/costs are normalized so that they are
comparable to child care costs. Suppose that a household i derives idiosyncratic utility in
monetary terms of qw;i from formal care and qb;i from informal care. Household i-s idiosyncratic
relative beneﬁt/cost of using informal over formal care is then qb;i  qw;i, the solid curve A in
Figure 3.2. We assume that these idiosyncratic beneﬁts/costs follow a generalized logistic
function. For household i who is located at xi on the horizontal axis we have his or her
idiosyncratic beneﬁt/cost as
qb;i  qw;i = q +
q
1+e f(xi x); (3.6)
where q is the lower asymptote, q is the upper asymptote, x is the so-called inﬂection point
where the derivative reaches its maximum, and we use f to steer the derivative at some point xi.
This function generates the following behaviour. For an initial price of informal care pb and
formal care sw0pw for parents, all individuals to the left of xa will choose formal care, and the
rest will choose informal care. When we increase the child care subsidy rate, the formal price for
parents drops to sw1pw. As a result, more people will choose formal care, the share rises from xa
to xb. The logistic shape further implies that when the price of formal care drops, parents will
switch to formal care at an increasing rate, which we motivate in the calibration below.
Furthermore, relevant for labour supply is that when we increase the subsidy, the government
spends (sw0 sw1)pwxw more on subsidies, but the shaded areaC is `lost´ since parents that
switch to formal care give up their idiosyncratic beneﬁt from using informal care over formal
care.
23The share of paid formal care follows from the condition that for the indifferent household we
have qb(i) qw(i) = pb swpw, so










We further assume that individuals are uniformly distributed over the x-s, hence xi is also the
share of individuals s choosing paid formal care. The resulting shares of households that
chooses formal care will differ across household types and labour supply options, since the
parental price of formal care swpw rises with household income.
The cost of child care relevant for labour supply
Now we have all the elements to calculate the average cost of child care for a particular
household type in a particular labour supply option. For a particular labour supply option j with





















where we introduce a term qp(i) which is the average beneﬁt or cost of using formal care relative
to the care by the parents themselves, more on this below. The average price of child care in a
labour supply option is a weighted average of the price for formal and informal care, minus the
average idiosyncratic beneﬁt/cost of individuals using informal care over formal care, and minus
the idiosyncratic beneﬁt or cost of formal child care relative to care by the parents themselves. Is
there a gain for parents from using child care other than facilitating labour participation? This
seems questionable, at least in the perception of the parents (which is what matters for labour
supply). Most parents seem to minimize their use of child care, and hence there seems to be an
additional cost associated with sending the kids to child care. However, it is hard to put a
number on this. For simplicity we assume that there is no utility gain or loss for the parents from
using formal child care relative to taking care of the kids themselves, so we set the last term in
(3.8) to zero. This is actually innocuous, the last term is a constant per labour supply option in
the simulations.
This still leaves the expression for the integral
R 1











































where s(j) is the xi from (3.7) (see above). For each labour supply option we have two of these
prices, one for child care for 0-3 year olds, pcc;3(j), and for child care for 4-12 year olds,
pcc;12(j). The cost of child care for a particular labour supply is then
pcc;3(j)cc3(j)+ pcc;12(j)cc12(j). In each labour supply option we deduct these option speciﬁc
child care costs from consumption.17
Let us brieﬂy summarize how child care subsidies affect labour supply. Parents that work
more use more formal child care. Over the additional hours of child care they also get additional
subsidies, which stimulates labour supply. Working in the opposite direction is the drop in the
subsidy per hour of child care with household income and hence hours worked. Furthermore, the
choice between formal and informal care also depends on the subsidy rate. A higher subsidy rate
will cause some parents to switch from informal to formal care. When they do so they give up a
compensating differential, which also reduces the labour supply effect of a higher subsidy rate
for formal child care.
3.3 Wage formation
Child care subsidies not only affect participation via labour supply but also via (equilibrium)
unemployment. For unemployment it is the effect on labour costs that matters. However, since
the determination of labour costs is similar to Graaﬂand et al. (2001) and plays only a minor role
in our quantitative results, we keep the discussion here informal and brief and refer the interested
reader to Graaﬂand et al. (2001).
Regarding wage formation what matters is that labour costs, and thereby unemployment, rise
with the (average) tax and replacement rate (net income in unemployment over net income in
employment). We assume that child care costs are like a tax on income (see above). Child care
subsidies reduce child care costs and hence the tax on labour. This reduces labour costs and
therefore equilibrium unemployment. Note however, that this only holds for child care subsidies
that are not ﬁnanced by taxes or employers premiums.18 Child care subsidies also reduce the
replacement rate, again lowering labour costs and reducing equilibrium unemployment.
However, in the current system both parents need only work 1 hour per year to qualify for
subsidies for the whole year. Noting that parents may not want to give up their place when they
expect to be re-employed in the near future, and that the subsidy per hour rises when family
income drops, many unemployed may still use formal child care. We have no information on the
17 To be precise, we assume that child care costs are consumption from which the parents derive no utility.
18 Premiums appear to have a similar effect on labour costs as taxes, see Folmer (2009).
25use of formal child care by employment status. In the base setup we assume that 50% of child
care costs enters the replacement rate.19
19 Furthermore, taking into account that formal child care is only relevant for part of the workforce.
264 Calibration
We calibrate the scale parameters in the model to a projection for 2011, and the elasticity
parameters to the ﬁndings of the meta analysis by Ooms et al. (2003) for child care, Evers et al.
(2008) for labour supply and Graaﬂand and Huizinga (1999) for wage formation. A detailed
discussion of the calibration is given below.
4.1 Projection
We calibrate the scale parameters to reproduce a projection for the child care market in 2011.
After the dramatic drop in the parental contribution rates in 2006 and 2007, the government
increased parental contribution rates again in 2009 (somewhat, from 19 to 22% on average).
Furthermore, in 2010 there will be a large cut in subsidies for guest parents. There are no further
plans to change the subsidy rate after 2010 (at the moment), and hence 2011 and beyond can be
seen as the new long term policy setup. Furthermore, with the projected dramatic cut in
subsidies to guest parents, the child care system will become more reminiscent of the older
system where it was largely unsubsidised, the period for which we have empirical studies on e.g.
the price elasticity.
For formal child care in 2011 we use the projection of Commissie Van Rijn (2009), a
committee that was instituted to study future developments of the child care market and analyse
reform options. The projection for 2009 is a simple extrapolation of the data for 2008 and the
preliminary data for 2009 (`technical analysis´). This results in a growth rate of 9% for daycare
and 18% for out-of-school care for 2009. Guest parent care is projected to grow at a
substantially slower pace than in 2006-2008, but still some 30% in 2009. For 2010 and 2011 the
Commissie van Rijn (2009) projects that formal care for 0-3 year and 4-12 year olds will grow at
4.5% and 9% per year respectively (half of the growth rate over the period 1994-2004). Guest
parent care will drop due to the dramatic drop in the subsidy rate. The preliminary data for 2009
indeed suggest a signiﬁcant slowdown of the growth in daycare and out-of-school care.20
There are a number of reasons why we may expect a signiﬁcant drop in the growth rate of
formal child care, not only compared to the high growth rates of recent years, but also compared
to the (lower) growth rates of e.g. the period 1994-2004 (before the Law on child care): i) the
growth in female participation will be much lower than in the past (see Euwals and Folmer,
2009), ii) the parental contribution rate (and hence the price for parents) will no longer drop21
and iii) supply has largely caught up with demand.22 A signiﬁcant slowdown in the growth of
20 As projected by Jongen (2008).
21 Before 2005 the parental contribution rate dropped mainly because more subsidized places became available, not
because the subsidy rate for formal places went up.
22 In 1990 the number of places on waiting lists was 130% of the number of formal places (CPB, 1998), by 2002 this
27Table 4.1 Projected macro variables, 2011
0-3 Year olds 4-12 Year olds Total
Expenditures on formal child carea 2.36 .95 3.30 (100%)
- Government 1.12 .53 1.65 ( 50%)
- Employers .66 .27 .93 ( 28%)
- Workers/parents .58 .15 .73 ( 22%)
Share of paid formal care in total paid care .90 .75 .85
a Numbers are in billions of euro.
formal care is also consistent with international data on participation rates by children in child
care from OECD (2008). The Netherlands is quickly catching up with Scandinavia when it
comes to daycare, see Jongen (2008). The participation rate of 0-3 year olds in formal care
excluding guest parent care (which is an international oddity), is projected to increase from 25%
in 2004, to 39% in 2007 and then to 54% in 2011. This is in line with the participation rates in
Scandinavian countries (in 2004): 62% in Denmark, 44% in Norway, 40% in Sweden, 35% in
Finland.23
The resulting aggregate expenditures on formal child care in 2011 are given in Table 4.1. By
2011, 3.3 billion euro (.6% of GDP) will be spent on formal child care. Given the projected
employers premiums and the subsidy rates by income set by the government, parents will pay
22% of formal care (on average), employers 28% (via premiums) and the government 50% (via
taxes).24
Table 4.1 also gives the projection for expenditures on paid informal care in 2011. Data, let
alone projections, on informal care are rare and typically based on small samples. We take the
sample of survey data from the most recent Labour Force Survey available, the one for 2007, the
so-called Monitor Arbeid en Zorg Module Kinderopvang, as our starting point. In 2007, 77% of
the parents used paid formal care as their main source of paid childcare for 0-3 year olds, and
23% used paid informal care. For 4-12 year olds the shares of paid formal and paid informal
were 68% and 32% in 2007, respectively. We correct these numbers for the difference in hours
per week in paid formal and paid informal care. Data from Kok et al. (2005) suggest that
average hours per week are 19 and 15 hours respectively for formal and informal paid care for
0-3 year olds, and for 4-12 year olds they are 8 and 10 hours per week, respectively. After we
take this into account we arrive at a share of 85% for formal care in total paid care for 0-3 year
percentage had dropped to 18% for daycare and 14% for out-of-school care (Ooms et al., 2003) and by 2007 this
percentage had dropped to less than 10% for out-of-school care (Taskforce Bestrijding Wachtlijsten Buitenschoolse
Opvang, 2007).
23 The comparison is somewhat complicated by the fact that paid (parental) leave around child birth is much longer in
Scandinavia than in the Netherlands, see Jongen (2008). With shorter paid leave, participation rates by 0-3 year olds in
formal care would probably be higher in Scandinavia.
24 Source: Ministry of Education, Culture and Science, personal communication.
28Table 4.2 Parameters, 2011
0-3 Year olds 4-12 Year olds
Scale parameter for incidence of paid child care g3 and g12 .20 .10
Income up to which parents pay the lowest percentage y 25. 25.
Income beyond which parents pay the highest percentage 138. 138.
Minimum contribution rate parents sw .05 .05
Maximum contribution rate parents sw .63 .35
Annual full time price of a paid formal place pw (x1000 euro) 17. 17.
Annual full time price of a paid informal place pb (x1000 euro) 13. 13.
Lower asymptote in preference distribution formal-informal q − 8.5 − 13.
Upper asymptote in preference distribution formal-informal q 17. 26.
Inﬂection point preference distribution formal-informal x0 .79 .57
Derivative parameter preference distribution formal-informal f 27. 5.5
olds, and 62% for 4-12 year olds, in 2007. The data from Berden and Kok (2009) suggest that
there was a substantial shift from paid informal to paid formal care over the period 2004 and
2008. For 2011, we assume that the shift from paid informal to paid formal care continues, and
we assume that another 33% of paid informal care goes to paid formal care by 2011. This gives
us a share of paid formal care in total paid care of 90% and 75% respectively for 0-3 year and
4-12 year olds, in 2011.
4.2 Parameters
Next, we need to reproduce these aggregate numbers for paid formal and informal care for the
0-3 year olds and 4-12 year olds using the micro parameters in the model, see Table 4.2.
First, we set the scale parameters g3 and g12 that translate a certain overlap in working hours
by parents into a total demand for paid child care for 0-3 and 4-12 year olds, so that these total
demands are in line with the macro projection in Table 4.1.
Then, we assume that the full price of a formal child care place pw is 17 thousand euro per
year (6 euro 50, for 50 hours per week, for 52 weeks per year),25 and the full price of paid
informal care pb is assumed to be 75% of the full price of paid formal care, in line with the data
in Kok et al. (2005).
Next, we need to determine the subsidy rate for 0-3 and 4-12 year olds sw by household
income, to determine the price of formal care for parents.26 In Section 2 we already discussed
25 The exact price is not that important. The scale parameter for the use of paid care, and the full price of formal and
informal care are interchangeable in the formulae for the use of paid formal care, and we still need to get to the same
macro expenditures.
26 Note that the full price of paid formal (and paid informal) care is assumed to be the same for all households. At least for
29the parental share in the full price of formal care, which rises with income due to the drop of the
subsidy rate with income, see Figure 2.4. When we look at how the parental share varies with
household income we have basically a ﬂat segment for the lowest incomes, then a segment
where the fee rises linearly with income, and then another ﬂat segment for the highest incomes.
For 2011 we use a table with a contribution rate for parents of 5%27 up to 25 thousand euro (sw),
and then a linearly rising rate up to 63% for 0-3 year olds and 35% for 4-12 year olds at 138
thousand euro, beyond which the contribution rate for parents remains constant at sw. This
contribution rate is a mixture of the table for the `ﬁrst ´ child and the table for the `second ´
child (`third ´ child etc.), where ﬁrst etc. refers to the child for which parents claim the highest
expenditures. In the model we can not distinguish between the ﬁrst and second child. However,
we have data from the tax ofﬁce on the average contribution rate for 0-3 year olds and 4-12 year
olds separately. We use this information to reduce the maximum contribution rate in the table for
0-3 year olds and 4-12 year olds separately, up to the point where the average contribution rate
matches the data per group. The data indicate that 4-12 year olds are more likely to be a second
child than 0-3 year olds. The tax ofﬁce takes the child that uses the most child care as the ﬁrst
child, and this is more likely to be a 0-3 year old (the 4-12 year olds spend most of the working
day at school and hence use less hours). 138 thousand euro is some arbitrary high family income
beyond which few people are left, see also Figure 2.4.
Given parental prices for paid formal and paid informal care, the idiosyncratic preference
distribution of paid informal over paid formal care determines the share of individuals using paid
formal and paid informal care, and together with the labour supply elasticity it determines the
price elasticity of formal child care demand. The idiosyncratic preference distribution has four
parameters (see equation (3.6)): the lower asymptote, the upper asymptote, the inﬂection point
where the derivative reaches its maximum, and the derivative parameter at the inﬂection point.
We set the inﬂection point x0 so that conditional on the other parameters, the share of paid
formal care for 0-3 and 4-12 year olds, is line with the projection of Table 4.1. Despite the lower
parental fee for 4-12 year olds than for 0-3 year olds, a larger share of parents uses paid informal
care for 4-12 year olds than for 0-3 year olds. As a result, the inﬂection point needs to be higher
for 0-3 year olds.
Next, we set the derivative parameter f so that conditional on the other parameters the price
elasticity of formal care at a contribution rate of 40% for parents on average, the setup in 2005,
is in line with the ﬁndings of the meta analysis of Ooms et al. (2003). Ooms et al. (2003)
suggest that the price elasticity for child care use by 0-3 year olds is about -.15 and for guest
parent care is about -.7. Unfortunately, they do not study the price elasticity of out-of-school
care. We calibrate the derivative parameter for 0-3 and 4-12 year olds so that we arrive at a price
formal care this does not seem to be at odds with the data, e.g. the data in De Bruijn et al. (2004) suggest that the spread
in full prices for formal child care is small.
27 The average for the ﬁrst and second child at 25 thousand euro in 2009.
30elasticity of .2 for paid formal starting at a contribution rate of 40% for parents (see the
simulations below).
We set the upper asymptote q at such a level that we get a higher price elasticity of paid
formal care when the contribution rate drops below the current level of 22%. Speciﬁcally, we
assume that the price elasticity of paid formal care goes to .4 once the parental contribution rate
drops below 22%. Indeed, the recent data suggests that the price elasticity is much higher at
higher subsidy rates. Over the period 2005-2008 the price of paid formal care dropped by some
50%. Over the same period, daycare increased by 55% and out-of-school care increased by 98%
per year. Based on the trend growth rates of 9 and 18% over the period 1994-2004 for 0-3 and
4-12 year olds respectively, we would expect 30% growth for 0-3 year olds 64% growth for 4-12
year olds over the period 2005-2008. We are missing 25 and 34% respectively. When we
attribute all of this to the 50% drop in the average parental contribution rate, we arrive at a price
elasticity of about .6. But, there were some other factors that may have contributed to the higher
growth rate in 2005-2008, for example the business cycle upswing and the so-called Motie Van
Aartsen-Bos that made schools responsible for arranging to out-of-school care from 2007
onwards.28 For these reasons we take a more conservative value of .4 at the current contribution
rate.
Finally, we set the lower asymptote q to minus the upper asymptote.29 This is clearly
arbitrary, but note that the far left side of the distribution is not relevant for our simulations. Even
in the extreme case where we abolish all subsidies to paid formal care, the price of paid informal
care minus the price of paid formal care drops only somewhat below the horizontal axis in
Figure 3.2.30
4.3 Selected calibration outcomes at the micro level
Table 4.3 gives selected outcomes of the calibration at the micro level, for secondary earners in
couples. We give outcomes for 0-3 year olds and 4-12 year olds by skill type and labour supply
option. Both the breadwinner and the (potential) secondary earner can be low or high skilled, so
we have four skill combinations. Furthermore, (potential) secondary earners can choose from:
not working (child care costs are zero), working in a small part-time job (30%), a medium
28 However, note that this did not change the price of out-of-school care for parents, and the acceleration in the use of
paid formal care is present in both daycare and out-of-school care. This casts some doubt on whether the Motie Van
Aartsen-Bos was a major factor in the growth of paid formal care.
29 Actually, half of q, q is minus the lower asymptote plus the upper asymptote.
30 The calibration procedure is a rather time consuming trial-and-error process. First of all, the share of individuals using
paid formal and paid informal care differs over households types and labour supply choices since the subsidy rate
depends on household income. The share we present in Table 4.1 is a weighted average of all these different households
and household choices. Furthermore, we can not determine the price elasticity of formal care before we run the
simulations, the price elasticity is the average response of all the different responses of the different households regarding
the choice of formal and informal care and their labour supply choices.
31Table 4.3 Calibration outcomes at the micro level in 2011: partners in couplesa
0-3 Year olds 4-12 Year olds
Working hours (as a % of full time) 30 50 80 30 50 80
Annual parental fee formal full time place
- High skilled breadwinner, high skilled partner 4.257 4.834 5.499 2.772 3.098 3.473
- High skilled breadwinner, low skilled partner 3.932 4.334 4.876 2.589 2.816 3.122
- Low skilled breadwinner, high skilled partner 3.127 3.705 4.369 2.135 2.461 2.836
- Low skilled breadwinner, low skilled partner 2.799 3.201 3.743 1.950 2.177 2.482
Share paid care in total paid care
- High skilled breadwinner, high skilled partner .990 .846 .833 .746 .735 .724
- High skilled breadwinner, low skilled partner .990 .880 .845 .752 .744 .735
- Low skilled breadwinner, high skilled partner .990 .990 .874 .770 .757 .744
- Low skilled breadwinner, low skilled partner .990 .990 .990 .778 .768 .756
Annual parental cost of a full time place
- High skilled breadwinner, high skilled partner 4.257 4.755 5.312 2.299 2.540 2.814
- High skilled breadwinner, low skilled partner 3.936 4.326 4.790 2.162 2.332 2.558
- Low skilled breadwinner, high skilled partner 3.138 3.710 4.357 1.817 2.065 2.346
- Low skilled breadwinner, low skilled partner 2.814 3.212 3.748 1.673 1.849 2.081
Demand for child care in full time equivalents
- High skilled breadwinner, high skilled partner .058 .098 .158 .028 .047 .076
- High skilled breadwinner, low skilled partner .070 .106 .161 .034 .051 .078
- Low skilled breadwinner, high skilled partner .038 .078 .138 .019 .038 .066
- Low skilled breadwinner, low skilled partner .050 .086 .141 .024 .042 .068
0-12 Year olds
Total annual child care costs per labour supply option
- High skilled breadwinner, high skilled partner .313 .587 1.052
- High skilled breadwinner, low skilled partner .346 .579 .972
- Low skilled breadwinner, high skilled partner .154 .368 .757
- Low skilled breadwinner, low skilled partner .180 .354 .672
a In thousands of euro.
part-time job (50%) and a large part-time job (80%). Table 4.3 gives the corresponding prices of
child care and the resulting choices over paid formal and paid informal care for the options
where the parents use child care.
The top four rows give the annual parental fee for a full time formal place. More skills imply
a higher gross wage, which implies more family income. Hence the subsidy rate is lower for
high skilled and the parental fee is higher. Here we also see the implicit marginal tax in the
parental fee per hour. Working more hours increases household income, which reduces the
subsidy per hour and increases the price of formal care for parents. We further see that parents
pay less for 4-12 year olds than for 0-3 year olds, because 4-12 year olds are more often the
`second ´ child, parents receive a higher subsidy for the second child.
The next four rows give the shares of paid formal care in total paid care. The individual
32preference distribution is the same over skill groups and labour supply options, what differs is
the parental fee for formal care. Low incomes receive more subsidy per hour, and hence use
more formal care. Indeed, families with a low skilled breadwinner and a low skilled partner
always choose paid formal care in the calibration.31 Furthermore, individuals working more
hours are less likely to use paid formal care, the have more income and hence a lower subsidy
rate per hour formal care. We further see how the different preference distributions for paid
informal over paid formal care for 0-3 and 4-12 year olds results in lower shares of paid formal
care for 4-12 year olds, despite the lower parental fee for parents, in line with the data.
Then we have the four rows that show the full time price of total paid formal care, which is
the weighted average of formal and informal paid care corrected for the compensating
differential, see equation (3.10). What is important here is that this price rises less with hours
worked than the price for a formal place. Indeed, the option to choose paid informal care gives
parents a way to insulate themselves from a higher parental fee. We see this effect in operation
when we go from lower to higher skills and from less to more working hours. In both cases the
increase in the price of paid care including the compensating differential is less than the increase
in the price of paid formal care. Note that the resulting price of a full time place still rises with
skill and working hours though.
The next four rows show the use of paid child care in full time equivalents per labour supply
option. Working more hours results in more demand for paid child care. But the demand for care
for 4-12 year olds is lower, in part because they only need to go to paid care after school hours.
At the bottom of the table we have the average annual child care costs over all couples with
dependent children, per labour supply option; the product of the use of paid formal care in full
time equivalents for 0-3 and 4-12 year olds and the respective parental prices. Working more
hours implies more child care costs because i) this increases the required number of child care
hours, and ii) because of the drop in the subsidy per hour resulting from the higher household
income. Note that effect i) is quantitatively more important than effect ii).
4.4 Labour supply and wage formation
Finally, we brieﬂy discuss the calibration of labour supply and wage formation. The calibration
of labour supply and wage formation are taken from the original MIMIC model.32
We calibrate the labour supply elasticity in MIMIC to the ﬁndings of the meta analysis of
Evers et al. (2008). They suggest a (uncompensated) labour supply elasticity for secondary
earners of .5, and a labour supply elasticity for breadwinners of .1 for the Netherlands. For
single parents we also take the larger value of .5 (also supported by Meghir and Phillips, 2008).
31 We restrict the maximum share of parents using paid formal care to .99, to prevent numerical problems.
32 See De Mooij et al. (2006) and Graaﬂand et al. (2001) for an elaborate discussion of the calibration of labour supply
and wage formation.
33For singles we take an intermediate value of .25. The high labour supply elasticity of secondary
earners and single parents makes child care subsidies an interesting policy option to stimulate
labour supply, even if we have to ﬁnance these subsidies with taxes.
The calibration of wage formation in MIMIC is based on the time series estimates of
Graaﬂand and Huizinga (1999). They ﬁnd an elasticity of labour costs (gross wages plus
employers premiums) with respect to the average tax rate of .6, and to the replacement rate of .3.
Hence, not all taxes are borne by labour in the form of lower net wages (and hence not all
subsidies go to labour). Furthermore, when we increase income in work relative to income out of
work via child care subsidies, wages will fall due to the drop in the replacement rate.
345 Simulations
We consider three sets of simulations. First we consider the effects of relatively small changes in
the subsidy rate across-the-board. Then we consider the effects of a change in the subsidy rate
targeted at the bottom or the top of the income distribution. We conclude with the effects of
more radical policy options; `free´ child care for parents and abolishing child care subsidies
altogether. In all the simulations we keep the aggregate contribution by employers constant, so
that all budgetary savings or costs are for the government. Furthermore, we balance the
government budget by an across-the-board reduction or increase in income tax rates.
5.1 Small changes in parental contribution rates
We start with the effects of relatively small changes in the subsidy rate. Speciﬁcally, we consider
pro rata changes in the parental contribution rates across household incomes, ranging from -25%
to +25%. As the lower incomes pay much less initially in percentage terms, their contribution
rate in percentage points rises less than the higher incomes. The pro rata changes are motivated
by the pro rata policy changes in recent years. We also consider the effects of a rise in the
parental contribution rate by +50 and +100%, to check the price elasticity of formal care for the
change in the subsidy rate from the much lower level in 2005 to the much higher level in the
current setup. Table 5.1 gives the results for the child care market, Table 5.2 gives the results for
labour participation.
5.1.1 Simulation results child care market
First consider the outcomes for the child care market. From the top rows in Table 5.1 we see that
the total parental fee changes less than the parental fee for formal care. This is a result of the
option of parents to choose between paid formal and paid informal care. When we e.g. increase
the parental fee for parents, some parents will switch from paid formal to paid informal care. In
this way parents partly insulate themselves from the price increase.
The next rows give the changes in the use of paid care. When we decrease the parental fee for
formal care, the use of formal care increases. We can also see the increasing price elasticity of
formal care when the subsidy rate drops. When we drop the parental fee 25% the sum of formal
care for 0-3 and 4-12 year olds increases by 9%, an elasticity of .4. Now consider the initial setup
in 2005 when the parental fee was almost double the fee it is now, which we illustrate using the
simulations with +100% and +50%. At +100% formal care is 13% less, and at +50% it is 8.2%
less. When we go from the simulation of +100% (reﬂecting 2005) to +50% (a `marginal´ change
starting from 2005), the parental fee drops by 25% (from `200´to `150´). Formal care increases
by (100-8.2)/(100-12.4)*100%= 5%. Hence, starting at a parental +100% of the current level the
price elasticity of formal care is .2, in line with the meta analysis of Ooms et al. (2003).
35Table 5.1 Small changes in the parental fee: long run effects on the child care market
Change in parental fee formal care − 25% − 10% − 5% + 5% + 10% + 25% + 50% + 100%
Percentage changes
Parental fee
− 0-3 Total − 23 − 9 − 5 5 9 22 43 85
− − Formal − 23 − 9 − 5 5 10 24 49 99
− 4-12 Total − 23 − 9 − 5 5 9 22 44 85
− − Formal − 25 − 10 − 5 5 10 25 50 99
Child care places
− 0-3 Total paid 1.9 .7 .3 − .4 − .7 − 1.7 − 3.2 − 6.1
− − Formal 11 4.0 1.1 − 1.0 − 2.7 − 4.7 − 8.2 − 12
− − Share formal in total paid (level) .99 .94 .92 .91 .89 .88 .86 .85
− 4-12 Total paid 1.9 .7 .3 − .4 − .7 − 1.7 − 3.2 − 6.1
− − Formal 5.4 2.0 .9 − .9 − 1.9 − 4.4 − 8.1 − 15
− − Share formal in total paid (level) .78 .77 .76 .75 .75 .74 .72 .69
− Total formal 9.2 3.4 1.0 − 1.0 − 2.4 − 4.6 − 8.2 − 13
Macro expenditures on formal child care 9.2 3.4 1.0 − 1.0 − 2.4 − 4.6 − 8.1 − 13
− Parents − 16 − 6.2 − 3.9 3.9 7.0 19 37 73
− Firms 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
− Government 24 9.1 3.5 − 3.4 − 7.4 − 16 − 30 − 54
Macro share in formal expenditures (level)
− Parents .16 .18 .19 .21 .22 .25 .30 .40
− Firms .26 .27 .28 .28 .29 .29 .31 .32
− Government .59 .55 .53 .51 .49 .45 .39 .28
From Table 5.1 we also see that the changes in total paid child care are less than the changes in
formal child care. Again, this is the result of parents switching between paid formal and paid
informal care in response to the change in the parental fee for formal care. Furthermore, the
extent of substitution of paid formal for paid informal care rises when the parental fee becomes
lower. The initial share of formal care in total paid care is .85. When we drop the parental fee by
25%, formal care rises by 9.2%. But total paid care rises only by 1.9%. Hence, (.092 * .85 -
.019)/(.092*.85) * 100% = 75% of the rise in formal care is substitution for paid informal care.
When we increase the parental fee by 25%, formal care drops by 4.6% and total care by 1.7%.
Substitution drops to (.046 * .85-.017)/(.046 * .85) * 100% = 57%. When we increase the price
by 100%, substitution is even less, (.13 * .85-.061)/(.13 * .85) * 100% = 45%. This is the logistic
distribution for idiosyncratic preferences at work (see Figure 3.2).33
33 Table 5.1 also shows that the percentage change in the use of total paid formal care is the same for 0-3 and 4-12 year
olds. This reﬂects the same underlying change in labour supply. Note that for a given labour supply choice, parents can
only choose whether they want to use paid formal or paid informal care, the total demand for paid care in a particular
labour supply is given.
36Table 5.2 Small changes in the parental fee: long run effects on participation and production
Change in parental fee formal care − 25% − 10% − 5% 5% 10% 25% 50% 100%
Percentage changes
Labour supply in hours .05 .02 .01 − .01 − .02 − .05 − .11 − .21
− Breadwinners .07 .03 .01 − .01 − .02 − .06 − .12 − .24
− − With children < 17 .11 .04 .02 − .02 − .04 − .10 − .20 − .38
− Secondary earners .10 .04 .02 − .02 − .04 − .09 − .19 − .36
− − With children < 17 .16 .06 .03 − .03 − .06 − .15 − .29 − .56
− Single parents .50 .20 .11 − .10 − .20 − .52 − 1.0 − 2.0
− Singles − .02 − .01 .00 .00 .01 .01 .02 .03
Labour supply in persons .02 .01 .00 .00 − .01 − .01 − .03 − .05
Unemployment rate (absolute changes) − .01 .00 .00 .00 .01 .01 .02 .03
Employment in hoursa .07 .03 .01 − .02 − .03 − .08 − .15 − .29
Budgetary shift ex anteb (million euro) 393 119 66 − 59 − 111 − 269 − 480 − 885
a Private sector employment.
b Budgetary shift for given levels of participation, but with substitution of formal for informal child care.
When we look at the share of formal care in total paid care, Table 5.1 shows that when the
parental fee drops by 25%, we end up with 99% of parents using formal care for 0-3 year olds
when they use paid care. This is the upper limit in the model (to prevent numerical problems).
This is the inevitable result when we want the share of paid informal care and the price elasticity
of paid formal care to be in line with the data in our model. The question is what happens if the
formal parental fee drops even further, in particular when it drops to zero. This is the question
we take up in Section 5.3 below. There we consider some scenarios where parents not only
substitute paid informal care for paid formal care, but also unpaid informal care for paid formal
care, if the price is low enough. Indeed, substitution of unpaid informal care is another candidate
for the observed higher price elasticity of formal care at higher subsidy rates.
Turning to the aggregate expenditures on formal child care, we see that parents spend less on
formal child care when the price drops. The price elasticity of formal care is less than one, so the
drop in the price dominates the rise in demand. We ﬁx the aggregate contribution of ﬁrms, so the
additional expenditures are covered by the government. The government has to pay more
because of the higher subsidy rate and because of the higher use of formal child care.34
5.1.2 Simulation results participation
Table 5.2 gives the resulting changes in participation. When the parental fee of formal child care
drops participation goes up. Participation rises both on the intensive and the extensive margin.
On the intensive margin, parents with young children will work more hours, in particular single
34 Table 5.1 also gives the shares in total expenditures.
37parents who rely heavily on paid care since there is no partner who can look after the children.
On the extensive margin, labour supply in persons goes up, some parents will join the labour
force, and unemployment drops, subsidies for formal care make working more attractive than
being unemployed. Households without children will work a bit less, due to the ﬁnancing of the
subsidies with higher tax rates, consider e.g. the group of singles.
Overall, employment goes up by .07% when the parental fee drops by 25%. The associated
budgetary shift (rise in government expenditures on child care) is some 393 million euro ex ante,
where we deﬁne ex ante as the budgetary costs of the increase in the subsidy for a given level of
participation (in line with e.g. De Mooij et al., 2006). .07% corresponds to 4150 full time
equivalents (FTE) in the model in 2011. Hence, the impulse implies a budgetary shift of 95
thousand euro per FTE. This is substantially more per FTE than when we increase the subsidy
rate. When we increase the parental fee by 25%, the budgetary savings are 269 million euro, and
we lose .08% of employment, or a budgetary shift of 57 thousand euro per FTE. When we
increase the parental fee by 100%, we get to a budgetary shift of 52 thousand euro per FTE.
Hence, the effectiveness of child care subsidies drops off signiﬁcantly in the model when we
increase the subsidy rate to current levels. This is the result of the increased substitution of paid
formal for paid informal care as the fee for parents drops. This pushes expenditures up but has
little effect on participation, parents give up compensating differentials by switching to formal
care. Indeed, the labour supply effect on the last person to switch is zero.
5.2 Changes in the parental fee for low and high incomes
Next, we consider whether targeting changes in the parental fee at low or high income families
makes a difference in terms of aggregate outcomes. It is important to note that we start from a
situation where the lowest incomes pay only 5% of the full price of formal child care. Since we
can not go much lower, we will consider an increase in the parental contribution rate. We
consider three simulations, see Figure 5.1 below. The solid line is the initial relation between
household income and the parental share in the full price of child care. In the ﬁrst simulation we
raise the minimum parental share, locus A. In the second simulation we raise the maximum
parental share, locus B. In the third simulation we increase both the minimum and the maximum
parental share, locus C. In all simulations the ex ante budgetary savings on formal child care are
300 million euro. Table 5.3 gives the resulting effects on the child care market variables, and
Table 5.4 gives the effects on participation.
5.2.1 Simulation results child care market
From Table 5.3 we see that when we increase the minimum contribution rate, the higher parental
fee falls mostly on the low-skilled. When we increase the maximum contribution rate, the
increase is more evenly spread across skill types. When we increase both the minimum and





















maximum contribution rate, we get values in between these two cases.
When we look at the effects on the use of total paid child care, we see only minor
differences, but there is a somewhat larger response in formal child care when we raise the
minimum contribution rate. The latter is the result of the logistic distribution of idiosyncratic
preferences for paid informal over paid formal care (again, see Figure 3.2). Raising the
minimum contribution rate mostly affects households that have a very low contribution rate.
Hence, we start in the more elastic top part of the preference distribution when it comes to using
formal care.
For completeness, we also report the changes in aggregate expenditures on formal child care
in response to the targeted changes in the parental contribution rate. The change in aggregate
expenditures follows the change in the volume of formal care.
5.2.2 Simulation results participation
Table 5.4 gives the resulting changes in participation. The simulation results suggest that
targeting the increase in the parental fee at low or high incomes makes little difference for the
macro effect on participation. To understand why it is important to realize that there are two
effects of the current child care subsidy system on the incentives for parents to work more or less.
First, the child care subsidy per hour is regressive in household income (drops with income).
This is a disincentive for parents to work more. But second, when parents work more hours, they
use more child care hours. Since parents receive a subsidy per hour, this is an incentive for
parents to work more hours. In the current system, the net effect is that parents who work more
39Table 5.3 Targeted changes in the parental fee: long run effects on the child care market
Change in parental fee formal care Low incomes High incomes Across-the-board
Percentage changes
Parental fee
− 0-3 Total 25 22 24
− − High-skilleda 16 22 18
− − Low-skilledb 32 23 29
− − Formal 28 24 27
− 4-12 Total 37 33 36
− − High-skilleda 26 36 30
− − Low-skilledb 45 31 40
− − Formal 43 37 42
Child care places
− 0-3 Total − 1.8 − 1.9 − 1.9
− − Formal − 5.8 − 4.9 − 5.7
− 4-12 Total − 1.8 − 1.9 − 1.9
− − Formal − 6.6 − 5.5 − 6.4
− Total formal − 6.0 − 5.1 − 5.9
Macro expenditures on formal child care − 6.0 − 5.1 − 5.9
- Parents 24 20 23
- Firms 0 0 0
- Government − 21 − 18 − 20
a Couples with a high-skilled breadwinner.
b Couples with a low-skilled breadwinner.
receive more subsidies, and the system promotes labour supply.
Now consider the two simulations where we increase the minimum and maximum
contribution rate respectively. When we increase the minimum contribution rate, we make the
system less regressive. Via the ﬁrst channel this promotes labour supply, as the subsidy per hour
drops off at a slower pace with income. However, at the same time we reduce the subsidy per
hour. Via the second channel this discourages labour supply as individuals that work more hours
also use more child care. We can see that the second effect dominates the ﬁrst effect, and overall
labour supply drops. What is particularly problematic with the second effect is that the decrease
in the subsidy hits a rather elastic group, single parents, when we increase the minimum
contribution rate, see Table 5.4. When we increase the maximum contribution rate, we make the
system more regressive. Via the ﬁrst channel this damages labour supply. Furthermore, the drop
in the subsidy per hour also discourages labour supply. But in this case we target less of the drop
in the subsidy at the elastic group of single parents. The overall result is that increasing the
parental contribution for high incomes is only slightly more damaging to labour supply than
increasing the parental contribution for low incomes.
Let us conclude the analysis of targeted changes in the subsidy rate with an important but. The
40Table 5.4 Targeted changes in the parental fee: long run effects on participation
Change in parental fee formal care Low incomes High incomes Across-the-board
Percentage changes
Labour supply in hours − .05 − .06 − .05
− Breadwinners − .04 − .07 − .05
− − With children < 17 − .07 − .12 − .09
− Secondary earners − .08 − .11 − .09
− − With children < 17 − .13 − .17 − .15
− Single parents − .78 − .54 − .70
− Singles .01 .01 .01
− Low-skilled − .05 − .05 − .05
− High-skilled − .05 − .06 − .06
Labour supply in persons − .02 − .02 − .02
Unemployment rate (absolute changes) .01 .01 .01
- Low-skilled .04 .02 .03
- High-skilled .01 .00 .01
Employment in hoursa − .08 − .09 − .08
- Low-skilled − .10 − .09 − .10
- High-skilled − .08 − .09 − .08
Budgetary costs ex anteb (million euro) − 300 − 300 − 300
a Private sector employment.
b Budgetary shift for given levels of participation, but with substitution of formal for informal child care.
parental fee for low incomes is very low indeed. At 5% of the full price per hour they pay less
than 35 cents per hour of child care. One may wonder if this inﬂuences the choice over paid
formal and unpaid informal care as well. Indeed, the low price for low income households may
have led them to substitute almost free formal care for almost free informal care. In this case, we
may expect the reverse to happen when we increase the parental fee for low incomes. This
would lead to an additional reduction in child care subsidies, whereas the labour supply effect
would perhaps not be different (parents switch from one type of care which is almost for free to
another type of care which is almost for free). For the same revenue, we would then lose less
labour supply, when we target low income households.
5.3 Large rise in parental contribution rates
Next we consider the effect of major changes in the parental fee. Speciﬁcally, we consider the
case of substantial reductions in the child care subsidy rate, even close to zero, so as to study the
question what subsidies for formal child care have brought us in terms of participation. In the
subsequent section we consider the other extreme case of making child care `free´ for (working)
parents, and whether this is an effective policy from a labour supply perspective.
41Table 5.5 Major increase in the parental fee: long run effects on the child care market
Change in parental fee formal care +.6 bln +1.2 bln +1.8 bln +2.4 bln
Percentage changes
Parental fee
− 0-3 Total 50 112 182 268
− − Formal 58 137 224 336
− 4-12 Total 80 181 285 406
− − Formal 95 223 368 552
Child care places
− 0-3 Total paid − 3.7 − 7.9 − 12 − 17
− − Formal − 10 − 19 − 24 − 30
− 4-12 Total paid − 3.7 − 7.9 − 12 − 17
− − Formal − 12 − 23 − 33 − 43
− Total formal − 11 − 20 − 26 − 34
Macro expenditures on formal child care − 11 − 20 − 26 − 33
− Parents 48 105 162 220
− Firms 0 0 0 0
− Government − 40 − 79 − 114 -151
5.3.1 Simulation results child care market
In the calibration, government subsidies to formal child care amount to 2.58 billion euro, of
which .93 billion euro is collected via an employers premium. We consider cutting subsidies
back to almost zero, in steps of 600 million euro at a time. In these simulations, we cut the
subsidy rate pro rata, so in terms of percentage points the contribution rate per hour for low
income parents rises faster than for high income parents. In this way we can gradually phase out
the subsidies in a consistent manner. The effects on the child care market are given in Table 5.5,
and the effects on participation are given in Table 5.6.
Table 5.5 shows the substantial rise in the formal parental fee.35 However, also note that total
parental fee changes much less. Indeed, in the extreme case where subsidies are reduced by 2.4
billion euro, the formal parental fee goes up by 336 and 552% for 0-3 and 4-12 year olds
respectively, but the overall parental fee goes up by `only´ 268 and 406% respectively. By
switching from formal to informal care, parents can mitigate the rise in their parental fee.
The changes in child care places show the substantial drop in formal care, − 30 and − 43%
for 0-3 and 4-12 year olds, respectively. But the overall drop in paid care is much less, again
reﬂecting the substitution of formal for informal care.
Table 5.5 also gives the effects on aggregate expenditures. Again, we assume that the
premium for employers does not change, so we only see changes for parents and the
government. Given that the government pays 1.65 billion euro initially, they start getting more
35 Note that parents initially pay on average 25 and 16% of the full price per hour for 0-3 and 4-12 year olds respectively.
42Table 5.6 Major increase in the parental fee: long run effects on participation
Change in parental fee formal care +.6 bln +1.2 bln +1.8 bln +2.4 bln
Percentage changes
Labour supply in hours − .11 − .25 − .39 − .55
− Breadwinners − .10 − .23 − .37 − .52
− − With children < 17 − .16 − .37 − .58 − .81
− Secondary earners − .18 − .41 − .64 − .90
− − With children < 17 − .29 − .65 − 1.0 − 1.4
− Single parents − 1.5 − 3.1 − 4.9 − 6.8
− Singles .03 .05 .06 .07
Labour supply in persons − .04 − .09 − .14 − .19
Unemployment rate (absolute changes) .02 .04 .06 .08
Employment in hoursa − .17 − .36 − .56 − .78
Budgetary shift ex anteb (million euro) − 600 − 1200 − 1600 − 2400
a Private sector employment.
b Budgetary shift for given levels of participation, but with substitution of formal for informal child care.
money from employers premiums than they pay out in subsidies once we get to a reduction of
1.8 billion euro in subsidies. Hence the negative numbers for the government in the bottom row.
5.3.2 Simulation results participation
Table 5.6 gives the corresponding changes in participation. The lower subsidy rate discourages
participation by parents. Indeed, increasingly so. For the ﬁrst 600 million euro overall
participation drops by .11%, but when we move from 1.8 to 2.4 billion euro the marginal drop in
participation rises to .16%.36 We further see that unemployment rises as well. The overall effect
of cutting subsidies by 2.4 billion euro, almost all of the 2.58 billion euro in subsidies initially, is
a drop in (private sector) employment of almost .8%. Hence, all subsidies for formal child care
have increased employment by some .8%, taking into account the adverse effect of ﬁnancing
these subsidies with an (across-the-board) increase in income tax rates.
5.4 Free child care
Finally, we consider the other extreme, when formal child care becomes free for parents. The
subsidy rate for formal care goes to 100% for both 0-3 year olds, and 4-12 year olds. What
happens depends crucially on what we assume will happen with unpaid informal care, and some
other additional factors that played no role in the previous analyses by assumption. We consider
three scenarios. In the ﬁrst scenario, we just follow the same methodology as above and set the
36 Singles work a bit more, because the government uses the savings on child care subsidies to lower income tax rates.
43Table 5.7 Free child care: long run effects on the child care market
Change in parental fee formal care Free child care Free c.c. plus 1 bln euro Free c.c. plus 2 bln euro
Percentage changes
Formal child care places 24 54 85
Macro expenditures on formal child care 24 54 85
− Parents − 100 − 100 − 100
− Firms 0 0 0
− Government 85 146 206
subsidy rate to 100%. In the second scenario we assume that at a price of zero, there are
additional costs for the government that do not directly affect the labour supply decision of
parents. The third scenario is like the second scenario, but then assuming even more additional
costs for the government that do not directly affect the labour supply decision of parents. The
long run effects on the child care market are given in Table 5.7, and the effects on participation
are given in Table 5.8.
5.4.1 Scenario 1: no additional budgetary costs
Formal child care becomes free for parents. The budgetary shift is 1265 million euro. 730
million euro comes from the remaining parental fee of current users, the rest comes from parents
who substitute paid informal care for paid formal care. From our logistic distribution of
preferences of paid informal over paid formal care it follows that at a price of zero all parents use
paid formal care, and no parent uses paid informal care when formal care is for free.
The substitution of paid informal care for formal care, and the rise in participation (see
below), cause a rise in the use of formal child care, by 24%. Government expenditures on formal
child care rise by 85%.
Under this scenario, the effect on participation is only slightly less effective than (minus) the
symmetric case, where we reduce subsidies by 1200 million euro (see Table 5.6, second
column). Employment goes up by .35%. Indeed, we enter a region in the model where parents
no longer substitute paid informal for formal care. This implies that they no longer give up a
compensating differential, and the impulse becomes more effective in stimulating labour supply.
5.4.2 Scenarios 2 and 3: additional budgetary costs
However, there are a number of reasons why we think this is too optimistic. First, once the price
drops to zero, parents and their informal caregivers (family and friends) may decide to substitute
part of unpaid informal care for free formal care. In 2007, according to the Monitor Arbeid en
Zorg Module Kinderopvang, parents using unpaid informal care as a percentage of parents using
formal care was 84% for 0-3 year olds, and 259% (!) for 4-12 year olds. 135% for 0-12 year olds
44Table 5.8 Free child care: long run effects on participation
Change in parental fee formal care Free child care Free c.c. plus 1 bln euro Free c.c. plus 2 bln euro
Percentage changes
Labour supply in hours .25 .16 .07
− Breadwinners .31 .28 .24
− − With children < 17 .50 .46 .42
− Secondary earners .46 .34 .22
− − With children < 17 .73 .64 .56
− Single parents .23 1.8 1.3
− Singles − .05 − .15 − .24
Labour supply in persons .07 .05 .02
Unemployment rate (absolute changes) − .04 − .01 .01
Employment in hoursa .35 .22 .08
Budgetary shift ex anteb (million euro) 1265 2265 3265
a Private sector employment.
b Budgetary shift for given levels of participation, but with substitution of formal for informal child care.
if we weigh the numbers per group by the aggregate outlays per group. Presumably part of
unpaid informal care has since then been substituted for formal care, and more of it will in the
coming period, but still a sizeable part of unpaid informal care is expected to remain. Indeed,
given these numbers overall unpaid informal care seems to remain in the same order of
magnitude as overall formal care. Hence, there is still a lot of informal care that could
potentially be substituted for formal care.
In this context, note that 98% of children that reach the age of 4 years go to school in the
Netherlands,37 which is also (basically) for free, but school is not mandatory before children turn
5. Although school is not directly comparable, e.g. primary school teachers are higher educated
than caregivers in child care centres and the ﬁrst year is part of a longer curriculum, parents may
not be reluctant to hand over their children to formal care once the price drops to zero. Second,
existing users may start using formal care for other reasons than participation, for example to
educate themselves, do some sports or other leisure activities. Also, they may decide to reserve
care for school holidays, just in case, without actually using it. Third, all child care centres will
charge the maximum price for which parents can still get a subsidy, under the heading of e.g.
quality improvement. Currently, a signiﬁcant number of child care places charges less than the
maximum. Fourth, a large number of children goes to so-called peuterspeelzaalwerk (play
groups),38 which is part time care for small children, which is used not for participation by
parents, but for children to develop social skills. The subsidy rate is some 33% (Van Kampen,
2005). With formal care subsidized at 100% it will become interesting to reform themselves into
37 See OECD (2006).
38 190 thousand in 2007 (Statistics Netherlands).
45formal child care.
Because of all of these reasons, we may expect additional budgetary costs once child care
becomes free. However, we do not get additional participation for this money, parents exchange
one type of free care for another, get no additional subsidies for leisure activities if they work
more hours, etc. We model this as a rise in government consumption. The additional government
consumption needs to be ﬁnanced. The resulting additional rise in the income tax rates
discourages formal participation by parents.
The question is how much the budgetary costs for the government will rise. It is hard to put a
number on this, but the considerations above suggest it could be sizeable. As an illustration we
consider a scenario where the budgetary costs rise by an additional 1 billion euro (scenario 2),
and a scenario where the budgetary costs rise by an additional 2 billion euro (scenario 3). The
ﬁrst is equivalent to an additional 30% increase in formal care, and the second to an additional
60% increase in formal care. But then even in scenario 3, the rise is still substantially less than
e.g. the full potential of the remaining 135% of unpaid informal care.
Table 5.7 and 5.8 we illustrate the outcomes under these two alternative assumptions. Table
5.7 shows the additional rise in formal care, which goes up to 54 and 85% under scenario 2 and 3
respectively. All of this comes at the expense of the government, expenditures rise to 2265 and
3265 million euro under scenario 2 and 3 respectively. The associated rise in income tax rates
discourages participation. Both the effect on labour supply and unemployment are less
favourable. The employment effect drops to .22% under scenario 2. Under scenario 3 the
employment effect drops to .08%, or 692 thousand euro per additional FTE. Under this scenario,
free child care is a very poor policy to stimulate participation.
466 Sensitivity analysis
In this section we consider how sensitive the results are to key parameters. Speciﬁcally, we
consider how the results change when i) we assume a higher labour supply elasticity, and ii) we
assume a lower price elasticity.
6.1 Labour supply elasticity of partners and single parents
First we consider how the results change when we increase the labour supply elasticity of
partners and single parents from .50 to .85. .35 is one standard deviation of the variation in
labour supply elasticities of women in Evers et al. (2008), the basis for the calibration of labour
supply in MIMIC. Table 6.1 gives the results for a selected number of simulations: i) a decrease
in the parental fee for formal child care by 25%, ii) an increase in the parental fee for formal
child care by 100%, iii) abolishing most of the subsidies for formal child, 2.4 bln euro, by
increasing the parental fee, and iv) free child care for parents, where we assume there is an
additional budgetary cost of 1 billion euro resulting from e.g. substitution of unpaid informal
care for formal care (Scenario 2 above). As before, we assume that the government maintains a
balanced budget by increasing or decreasing income tax rates across-the-board. The columns
with `base´ are the base results with a labour supply elasticity of .50, `alt´ gives the results with
the alternative labour supply elasticity of .85.
From Table 6.1 we see that the effects on formal child care are hardly affected when we
change the labour supply elasticity. Indeed, the effect on the child care market depend to a large
extent on the substitution between formal and informal care.
As for labour supply, we see that the effect on the labour supply effects simply reﬂects the
alternative assumption on the labour supply elasticity. Reducing the parental fee becomes more
effective in raising labour supply, and increasing the parental fee becomes more damaging in
terms of lower labour supply. Also note that the effects on singles (without children) becomes
more favourable when we reduce the parental fee for parents, the policy change is now less
costly as the tax base expands, reducing the need for compensating additional income taxation.
The effects on unemployment remain largely similar.
6.2 Price elasticity of formal child care
Next we consider how the results change when we decrease the price elasticity of formal child
care from .3 to .2 for marginal changes in the parental fee. The alternative choice of .2 comes
from the meta analysis of Ooms et al. (2003) (which we argue is too low, in the calibration
above, given the steep rise in the use of formal care following the drop in the parental fee since
2005). To get a lower price elasticity of formal care we change the idiosyncratic preference
47Table 6.1 Sensitivity analysis: labour supply elasticity partners and single parents from .50 to .85a
− 25% 100% 2.4 bln Free c.c.
+ 1 bln euro
Base Alt Base Alt Base Alt Base Alt
Percentage changes
Formal child care places 9.2 9.6 − 13 − 15 − 34 − 39 54 56
Labour supply in hours .05 .08 − .21 − .31 − .55 − .82 .16 .27
− Breadwinners .07 .06 − .24 − .23 − .52 − .48 .28 .27
− − With children < 17 .11 .10 − .38 − .35 − .81 − .71 .46 .43
− Secondary earners .10 .17 − .36 − .63 − .90 − 1.5 .34 .64
− − With children < 17 .16 .29 − .56 − 1.0 − 1.4 − 2.3 .64 1.2
− Single parents .50 .91 − 2.0 − 3.6 − 6.8 − 11 1.8 3.2
− Singles − .02 − .01 .03 .01 .07 .04 − .15 − .13
Labour supply in persons .02 .03 − .05 − .09 − .19 − .32 .05 .09
Unemployment rate (absolute changes) − .01 − .01 .03 .02 .08 .06 − .01 − .01
Employment in hoursb .07 .11 − .29 − .41 − .78 − 1.1 .22 .35
a In the sensitivity we increase the labour supply elasticity of partners and single parents from .50 to .85. .35 is one standard deviation of
the variation in labour supply elasticities of women in Evers et al. (2008). `Base´ is the base calibration, `alt´ is the sensitivity analysis.
b Private sector employment.
Table 6.2 Sensitivity analysis: price elasticity formal child care from .3 to .2a
− 25% 100% 2.4 bln Free c.c.
+ 1 bln euro
Base Alt Base Alt Base Alt Base Alt
Percentage changes
Formal child care places 9.2 4.6 − 13 − 9.2 − 34 − 26 54 46
Labour supply in hours .05 .06 − .21 − .22 − .55 − .60 .16 .16
− Breadwinners .07 .07 − .24 − .26 − .52 − .56 .28 .27
− − With children < 17 .11 .11 − .38 − .41 − .81 − .88 .46 .44
− Secondary earners .10 .10 − .36 − .39 − .90 − .98 .34 .33
− − With children < 17 .16 .16 − .56 − .60 − 1.4 − 1.5 .64 .62
− Single parents .50 .51 − 2.0 − 2.0 − 6.8 − 7.3 1.8 1.7
− Singles − .02 − .01 .03 .02 .07 .06 − .15 − .14
Labour supply in persons .02 .02 − .05 − .06 − .19 − .21 .05 .04
Unemployment rate (absolute changes) − .01 − .01 .03 .02 .08 .08 − .01 − .01
Employment in hoursb .07 .08 − .29 − .30 − .78 − .85 .22 .21
a In the sensitivity we decrease the price elasticity of formal child care from .3 to .2. .2 is the value of the meta analysis of Ooms et al.
(2003). `Base´ is the base calibration, `alt´ is the sensitivity analysis.
b Private sector employment.
48distribution. Speciﬁcally, we increase the derivative parameter f (see equation (3.6)) to reduce
the share of parents that switch from paid informal to paid formal care when the subsidy rate
rises, and increase the value of x where the distribution crosses zero (see Figure 3.2) so as to
keep the initial share of parents use paid formal care the same. Table 6.2 gives the resulting
outcomes under this alternative assumption and the base outcomes. We present results for the
same selection of simulations as in 6.1 above.
We see that the alternative assumption on the price elasticity of formal care mainly affects
the child care variables. With the lower price elasticity, formal child care goes up less when we
reduce the parental fee and falls less when we increase the parental fee. The effects on labour
supply and unemployment are quite similar, though differences arise when we almost abolish all
subsidies on formal care (the third simulation in Table 6.2). We arrive at a lower price elasticity
by changing the preference distribution for formal relative to informal care. As a result, less
parents will switch from formal to informal care when we increase the parental fee. Hence, less
parents will insulate themselves from the rise in the parental fee of formal care. As a result,
labour supply is more adversely affected by the steep drop in the subsidies for formal care.
49507 Comparison with the ﬁndings of other studies
Table 7.1 gives an overview of empirical studies on the effect of child care subsidies on (female)
participation. We give the range found in the overview studies of micro econometric studies by
Blau and Curie (2004) and Anderson and Levine (2002), and add some recent studies for Europe
and the inﬂuential cross-country study by Jaumotte (2003).
The overview study of Anderson and Levine (2002) explicitly gives a range for the labour
supply elasticity of child care costs, running from -.05 to -.35. The overview study of Blau and
Currie (2004) does not give an explicit range for the labour supply elasticity. However, an
interesting part of their study is that they spend a section on studies that consider the interaction
of formal and informal care, and the range of these studies runs from -.1 to -.2. However, the
overview studies by Anderson and Levine (2002) and Blau and Currie (2004) contain mostly
studies outside Europe. Recent empirical studies for Europe come to lower labour supply
elasticities. Indeed, Lundin et al. (2008) even come to an effect of zero for Sweden, using a
natural experiment (where most other studies rely on a cross-section). Furthermore, the
coefﬁcient is estimated with great precision. Lundin et al. (2008) argue that their small effects
might be due to the generous initial subsidy rate in the reform they analyse (reminiscent of the
current Dutch setup).
Our results seem in line with the European studies, and are on the lower end of the overview
studies by Blau and Curie (2004) and Anderson and Levine (2002) which consider mostly
studies outside Europe. Let us consider the simulation where we increase the parental price of
formal child care by 25 percent from Section 5.1. We only have simulation results for all parents
with dependent children (<17 years old). To compare the results with the ﬁndings of the
micro-econometric studies we have to determine the group that uses paid formal care. When the
number of children is constant, some 25 percent of children < 17 years old will be 0-3 year old
and some 50 percent of the children will be 4-12 year old. About 50% of children 0-3 year old
use formal care and about 20% of children 4-12 year old use formal care. Hence, somewhat less
than 25% of parents with dependent children uses paid formal care (where there is probably
some overlap in parents that use formal care for 0-3 year olds and for 4-12 year olds). Hence, we
need to multiply the effect for parents with dependent children by about 4 to get to the effects for
the ones with dependent children using paid formal care alone. This generates an elasticity of
-.02 to -.03 for secondary earners and of -.07 for single parents. Note that is also matters how we
calculate the elasticity, the change is not that marginal. A rise in the price of 25% is equivalent to
a drop in the price of 20% when we take the new situation as our starting point (going from 1.25
to 1 rather than from 1 to 1.25). In this case the elasticities rise to -.03 to -.04 for secondary
earners and -.09 for single parents.
Our ﬁnding that the labour supply elasticity of child care costs for parents falls when the
subsidy rate is higher is in line with the ﬁndings of Lundin et al. (2008). Furthermore, our
51Table 7.1 Empirical studies on the effect of child care costs on labour participation
Study Country Period Participation elasticity Remarks
Recent micro studies for Europe
Lundin et al. (2008) Sweden 2002-2003 0.00 Dif-in-dif estimator
(participation and
share full time)
Kok et al. (2007) Netherlands 2002 − .06 Cross-section
(hours worked)
Wetzels (2005) Netherlands 1995 positive (insigniﬁcant) Cross-section
Wrohlich (2004) Germany 2002 − .04 to − .09 Cross-section
(hours worked)
Andren (2003) Sweden 1997-1998 − .16 Cross-section
(hours worked) Single mothers
Chone et al. (2003) France 1997 − .02 Cross-section
(hours worked)
Recent overview studies
Blau and Currie (2004) Various countries - − .1 to − .2 Studies taking into
account informal care
Anderson and Levine (2002) Various countries - − .05 to − .35 All studies
A recent macro study
Jaumotte (2003) OECD countries 1985-1999 − .05 Cross-country panel
(participation rate) women aged 25-54
ﬁnding that single mothers are quite responsive to lower formal child care costs, is in line with
the ﬁndings of Andren (2003) for Sweden.
528 Child care subsidies versus the secondary earner tax
deduction
Child care subsidies are an interesting policy option to stimulate labour market participation
because they target the relatively elastic group of secondary earners and single parents.
However, they also target the less elastic group of breadwinners with children. Furthermore,
child care subsidies not only promote formal participation by parents, but also the use of formal
care. Substitution of informal for formal care reduces the effectiveness of child care subsidies in
promoting formal participation, in particular when the subsidies have to be ﬁnanced with higher
taxes, and the substitution becomes more important at the current high subsidy rates as we argue
above.
There is another policy instrument that does not affect the choice over formal and informal
care, and is targeted solely at the elastic group of secondary earners and single parents: the
secondary (and single parents) earner tax deduction. Table 8.1 illustrates the different outcomes
for labour participation. We consider the impact of reducing the parental fee by 25%, which
implies a budgetary impulse of 393 million euro, and introducing a (additional) secondary (and
single parents) earner tax deduction, with the same budgetary impulse of 393 million euro. The
secondary earner tax deduction is phased in over the trajectory 50-300% of the minimum wage.
This implies that secondary earners that work more hours get more subsidies, similar to child
care subsidies.
We see that this secondary earner tax deduction is more effective in promoting labour supply
than the higher subsidy for formal child care. This is because it is solely targeted at the elastic
secondary earners and single parents and not at the less elastic breadwinners, and because less
subsidies get `wasted´ on formalising informal care.
In terms of labour supply, therefore, the secondary earner tax deduction seems more effective
than additional child care subsidies, in particular when viewed from the current high subsidy rate
for formal care for the average parent. However, also here there is a catch. The secondary earner
tax deduction goes to both parents that use formal and informal care. Hence, it is less targeted at
those households that have to rely on solely formal child care, because e.g. their parents live far
away.
53Table 8.1 Child care versus secondary earner tax deduction: long run effects on participation
Child care subsidya Secondary earner tax deductionb
Percentage changes
Labour supply in hours .05 .10
− Breadwinners .07 − .03
− − With children < 17 .11 − .05
− Secondary earners .10 .30
− − With children < 17 .16 .44
− Single parents .50 2.1
− Singles − .02 − .03
Labour supply in persons .02 .02
Unemployment rate (absolute changes) − .01 − .01
Employment in hoursc .07 .14
Budgetary shift ex anted (million euro) 393 393
a Drop in the parental fee by 25%.
b Income dependent secondary earner tax deduction, linear phase-in range over the interval 50-300% of the minimum wage.
c Private sector employment.
d Budgetary shift for given levels of participation, but with substitution of formal for informal child care.
549 Further issues
9.1 Endogenous preferences
The calibration of the model rests for a large part on the meta analyses of Ooms et al. (2003) on
the price elasticity of formal child care and of Evers et al. (2008) on the labour supply elasticity.
The empirical studies used in these meta analyses typically distill the effect by comparing
individuals. This has the potential risk of ignoring what one could call a `norm effect´ that
affects all individuals alike, e.g. more parents may decide to use formal care when more other
parents do so, or more mothers may decide to work when other mothers do so. If so, we may
understate the price elasticity of formal care, and the labour supply effect of child care subsidies.
There are a number of interesting studies that look into endogenous norms, see e.g. Lindbeck
(1995), Lindbeck and Nyberg (2006) and Vendrik (1993, 2003). However, I am not aware of an
empirical study that looks into a norm effect of child care subsidies on the use of formal care or
labour supply. This seems an interesting topic for future research.
9.2 Development of the child
An important element missing in the analysis above is the effect on the development of the child.
This is not the area of expertise of economists. But because this is might be an important
element, below we give a short review of some relevant literature from an interested reader, and
some indicators of the quality of child care in the Netherlands.
9.2.1 International literature on child care and child development
There is (virtually39) no Dutch empirical study that follows children over time, let alone looks at
the impact of different types of care on the development of the child and beyond. However, a
number of other countries have collected this type of data and looked at the effect of
participation in formal care. In particular, the National Day Care Study in the US is an
inﬂuential study. Some robust ﬁndings were that small groups and a higher education level of the
caregiver have a positive effect on the development of the child.40 Also, education programs for
caregivers specialized in the care for young children have a positive impact on the development
of the child. Recent studies of the National Institute of Child Health and Human Development
have shown that participation in formal care is good for the development of cognitive skills like
math and language, but may be detrimental for non-cognitive, social skills, in particular for
young (<3 year old) children. Also, in terms of hours per week, a lot of child care (>30 hours per
39 The proverbial exception is the so-called Proefkreche (daycare experiment) of the 1970s, see IJzendoorn et al. (2005).
But the sample size was small, and the attrition rate was high.
40 See Tavecchio (2002).
55week) seems beneﬁcial for disadvantaged children, whereas the reverse is true for children from
well-to-do families.41 The literature gives a mixed picture of the effect of participation in formal
child care on the development of the child.
9.2.2 Indicators of quality of daycare in the Netherlands
Although we do not have empirical studies on the impact of the participation in formal (and
other) child care in the Netherlands, we do have some indicators of the quality. Unfortunately,
we only have indicators of the quality of daycare, not of out-of-school care.
Table 9.1 gives two indicators for the quality of daycare. We see that the Netherlands scores
quite good in terms of children per caregiver, though we should note that babies are typically not
in daycare in Scandinavia. In terms of the typical education level of caregivers, the Netherlands
seems `average´, though we should note that in the ISCED classiﬁcation 4 is not necessarily
higher than 3. The typical education for caregivers in daycare in the Netherlands is
post-secondary training for 3 or 4 years, with specialization in children in the last year only.
Tertiary educated workers are rare in the child care sector, as opposed to Finland and Sweden,
though we should note that children in the Netherlands already start primary school at the age of
4, where the teacher has tertiary education, much sooner than in Scandinavia.
Vermeer et al. (2005) and De Kruif et al. (2009) use a large number of internationally
comparable indicators for the quality of daycare,42 and ﬁnd a disturbing trend. On a scale from 1
(bad) to 7 (excellent), their sample scored on average 4.8 in 1995, 4.3 in 2001, 3.2 in 2005 and a
meager 2.8 in 2008. Furthermore, in 2008, 49% of daycare centres got a rating of `insufﬁcient´
and 51% got a rating of `poor´, and none of the 200 daycare centres got a rating of `good´. In
response to the 2005 results, Bureau Bartels (2006) studied the causes of the drop in the quality
of daycare, and suggested that a shortage of qualiﬁed personnel, an increased workload and/or a
lack of coordination between the training on the one hand and the required skills of caregivers on
the other may have been responsible for the drop in quality. Time will tell if these are just
temporary problems related to the rapid growth of the sector, or long term challenges that
demand further action.
The studies by Vermeer et al. (2005) and De Kruif et al. (2009) are probably the most
objective studies into the quality of daycare in the Netherlands available, and they signal a
disturbing trend. However, note that this still does not answer the question of whether a child is
better or worse off in formal daycare compared to care by the parents or informal care.
Furthermore, survey studies of parents give a more mixed picture when it comes to the perceived
quality of formal child care. Parents using formal care give an average score of 8.1 (on a scale
from 1 to 10) in Kok et al. (2005) for the quality of formal childcare. However, Portegijs et al.
41 See Riksen-Walraven, 2000, Loeb et al. (2005) and Baker et al. (2005).
42 Speciﬁcally, they use the ITERS-R (Infant/Toddler Environment Rating Scale - Revised) for 0-2.5 year olds, and the
ECERS-R (Early Childhood Environment Rating Scale - Revised) for 2.5 to 5 year olds.
56Table 9.1 Indicators of child care qualitya
Children per caregiver Education level caregivers (ISCED)b
Netherlands 5 4
Denmark 5 3










a Source: OECD Family database and Onderwijsraad (2008).
b International Standard Classiﬁcation of Education of Unesco, a higher number indicates a higher education level, except for 3 and 4,
where 4 is not necessarily higher than 3.
(2006) ﬁnd that only 30% of parents in their survey (users and non-users) considers daycare in
the Netherlands a good care option.
The short overview above suggests that there is not a strong case for promoting participation
in formal child care across-the-board when we consider the development of the child, especially
given the trend in the quality. However, for disadvantaged groups it may still be beneﬁcial. But
in that case, the price of formal care is probably not the answer, as child care is already very
cheap for low income households. Also, a further increase in the subsidy rate would mostly lead
higher income groups to participate in formal care, but for children from this group the results
seem to be the poorest.
575810 Conclusion
In this paper, we present a model that can reconcile the rapid rise in formal child care with small
effects on (female) labour supply. The missing element is the substitution of informal for formal
care. A higher subsidy rate not only promotes formal participation, but also the use of formal
rather than informal care. The substitution of informal for formal care limits the effectiveness of
child care subsidies in promoting participation.
The data further suggest that the price elasticity of formal child care becomes higher when
the subsidy rate becomes higher, and show a massive shift of informal to formal care in response
to the recent drop in the parental fee. In line with these observations in our model parents
substitute informal for formal care at an increasing rate when the parental fee drops. This makes
child care subsidies less effective when the subsidy rate is already high. As a result, a further
increase in child care subsidies is a very costly policy to promote formal participation. Indeed,
we show that an (additional) income dependent secondary earner tax deduction is more effective
in promoting formal participation than a further increase in subsidies for formal child care.
Next to promoting formal participation, another policy objective of child care subsidies may
be the development of the child. However, international empirical studies give a mixed picture.
Participation in formal child care can be advantageous for some groups, but can be detrimental
for others. We have limited knowledge on the impact of participation in formal child care in the
Netherlands, but the indicators of studies by the Nederlands Consortium Kinderopvang
Onderzoek (Dutch Group for Child Care Research) signal a disturbing trend in the quality of
Dutch daycare.
The analysis builds on meta analyses on the elasticity of labour supply and wage formation,
and the price elasticity of formal child care. Although the model is calibrated on these meta
analyses and the outcomes are consistent with the patterns in the data, our conﬁdence in the
simulated effects would beneﬁt from a thorough micro econometric analysis using the recent
`natural experiments´. Since 2005 we have good data on the use of formal child care from the
tax ofﬁce. and we can study the impact on labour supply when the recent labour force surveys
become available. However, our analysis suggests that the analysis is incomplete when we
ignore informal child care, ﬁnding good data on informal child care therefore also seems crucial.
5960References
Anderson, P. and P. Levine, 2002, Childcare and mothers employment’ decisions, in: Card, D. en
R. Blank (eds.), Finding jobs, Russel Sage Foundation, New York, pp. 420-462.
Andren, T., 2003, The choice of paid childcare, welfare, and labor supply of single mothers,
Labour Economics, 10, pp. 133-147.
Baker, M., Gruber, J. and K. Milligan, 2005, Universal childcare, maternal labor supply and
family well-being, NBER Working Paper 11832, Cambridge.
Berden, C. and L. Kok, 2009, Participatie-effect kinderopvangtoeslag, SEO-rapport 2009-73,
Amsterdam.
Blau, D. and J. Currie, 2004, Preschool, day care and afterschool care: Who’s minding the kids?,
NBER Working Paper 10760, Cambridge.
Bruijn, D. de, Peeters-Vergeer, J., Ruiter, M. de, Werf, K. van der and G. Wever, Prijzen in de
kinderopvang 2004, Deloitte, The Hague.
Bureau Bartels, 2006, Mogelijkheden voor verbetering van de (proces)kwaliteit in
kinderdagverblijven, Bureau Bartels, Amersfoort.
Chone, P., D. Leblanc and I. Robert-Bobee, 2003, Female labour supply and child care in
France, CESifo Discussion Paper 1059, München.
Commissie van Rijn, 2009, Van beter subsidiëren naar beter organiseren, Ministry of Education,
Culture and Science, The Hague.
CPB, 1998, Macro Economische Verkenning 1999, CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic
Policy Analysis, The Hague.
Euwals, R. and K. Folmer, 2009, Arbeidsaanbod en gewerkte uren tot 2050, CPB Memorandum
225, The Hague.
Evers, M. , Mooij, R. de, D. van Vuuren, 2008, The wage elasticity of labour supply: a synthesis
of empirical estimates, De Economist, 156(1), pp. 25-43.
61Folmer, K., 2009, Why do macro wage elasticities diverge? A meta analysis, CPB Discussion
Paper 122, The Hague.
Graaﬂand, J. and F. Huizinga, 1999, Taxes and beneﬁts in a non-linear wage equation, De
Economist, 147(1), pp. 39-54.
Graaﬂand, J., Mooij, R. de, Nibbelink, A. and A. Nieuwenhuis, 2001, MIMICing tax policies
and the labour market, North-Holland, Amsterdam.
Groot, W. and H. Maassen van den Brink, 1996, Monitor kinderopvang - Verandering in gebruik
van kinderopvang 1991-1995, Amsterdam.
Jaumotte, F., 2003, Female labour force participation: Past trends and main determinants in
OECD countries, OECD Working Paper 376, OECD, Paris.
Jongen, E., 2008, Waarheen, waarvoor?, TPEdigitaal, 2(4), pp. 27-48.
Kok, L., Groot, I., Mulder, J., Sadiraj, K. and M. van Ham, 2005, De markt voor kinderopvang in
2004, SEO, Amsterdam.
Kok, L., Hop., P. and H. Pott-Buter, 2007, Kosten en baten van participatiebeleid, SEO,
Amsterdam.
Kruif, R. de, Riksen-Walraven, M., Gevers Deynoot-Schaub, M., Helmerhorst, K., Tavecchio, L.
and R. Fukkink, 2009, Pedagogische kwaliteit van de opvang voor 0- to 4-jarigen in Nederlandse
kinderdagverblijven in 2008, NCKO, Amsterdam.
Lindbeck, A., 1995, Hazardous welfare state dynamics, American Economic Review, 85(2), pp.
9-15.
Lindbeck, A. and S. Nyberg, 2006, Raising children to work hard: altruism, work norms, and
social insurance, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 121(4), pp. 1473-1503.
Loeb, S., Bridges, M., Fuller, B., Rumberger, R. and D. Bassok, 2005, How much is too much?,
NBER Working Paper 11812, Cambridge.
Lundin, D., Mork, E. and B. Ockert, 2008, How far can reduced childcare prices push female
labour supply?, Labour Economics, 15, pp. 647-659.
62Meghir, C. and D. Phillips, 2008, Labour supply and taxes, mimeo, IFS, London.
Mooij, R. de, Euwals, R., Folmer, K., Jongen, E., Koning, P., Nibbelink, A., Suijker., F. and A.
van Vuren, 2006, Reinventing the Welfare State, CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy
Analysis, The Hague.
OECD, 2006, Education at a glance, OECD, Paris.
OECD, 2008, Family database, OECD, Paris.
Onderwijsraad, 2008, Een rijk programma voor ieder kind, Onderwijsraad, The Hague.
Ooms, I., Groot, I., Eggink, E., Janssens, L. en J. van Seters, 2003, Landelijk ramingsmodel
kinderopvang 2002-2010, SCP Werkdocument 98, Social and Cultural Ofﬁce, The Hague.
Portegijs, W., Cloïn, M., Ooms, I. and E. Eggink, 2006, Hoe het werkt met kinderen, moeders
over kinderopvang en werk, Social and Cultural Ofﬁce, The Hague.
Riksen-Walraven, M., 2000, Tijd voor kwaliteit in de kinderopvang, Vossiuspers, Amsterdam.
Taskforce Bestrijding Wachtlijsten Buitenschoolse Opvang, 2007, Groeistuipen!, Buitenhek
Management and Consult BV, Utrecht.
Tavecchio, L., 2002, Van opvang naar opvoeding, Vossiuspers, Amsterdam.
Vendrik, M., 1993, Collective habits and social norms in labour supply: from micromotives to
macrobehaviour, Universitaire Pers, Maastricht.
Vendrik, M., 2003, Dynamics of a household norm in female labour supply, Journal of
Economic Dynamics and Control, 27, pp. 823-841.
Vermeer, H., IJzendoorn, R. van, Kruif, R. de, Tavecchio, L., Riksen-Walraven, M. and J. van
Zeijl, 2005, Kwaliteit van de Nederlandse kinderdagverblijven: trends in kwaliteit in de jaren
1995-2005, NCKO, Leiden.
Wetzels, C., 2005, Supply and price of childcare and female labour force participation in the
Netherlands, Labour, 19, pp. 171-209.
63Wrohlich, K., 2004, Child care costs and mothers labor supply: An empirical analysis for
Germany, DIW Discussion Paper 412, DIW, Berlin.
IJzendoorn, R. van, Tavecchio, L. and M. Riksen-Walraven, 2005, De kwaliteit van de
Nederlandse kinderopvang, Boom, Amsterdam.
64      